No Truce Without the Two Parties to the War... and No Civil Transition Without the People: Commenting on the Statements of Al-Burhan's Advisor Regarding the American Initiative

Ibrahim Elbadawi Abdelsattar: At first glance, the statements by Amjad Farid, political advisor to the army commander, might seem like a positive development in the army leadership's stance on the American initiative to end the war. He spoke of Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s readiness to hold 'serious consultations' with the United States, and of tripartite consultations including Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States to discuss a truce, along with mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and verify violations, in preparation for a democratic civil transition and the building of a unified national army. However, closer scrutiny of the language and context of the statement reveals that this may go no further than an attempt to reframe the American initiative in a way that allows the army leadership to appear in the position of the state that determines the fate of war and peace, while treating the Rapid Support Forces as a subject of arrangements rather than a warring party without whose participation the war cannot be stopped. This is not a recipe for serious peace, but a maneuver that may lead to further waste of time, while the war continues to kill Sudanese people and destroy what remains of their state, economy, and social fabric. The American proposal had called for a ninety-day humanitarian truce, followed by negotiations on a permanent ceasefire and a civil-led transition. Washington also called on both parties to accept the proposal without preconditions, while the army leadership has continued to condition its acceptance on a comprehensive withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces from cities. There is no peace through dialogue between al-Burhan and his allies. Consultations involving the army leadership, Saudi Arabia, and the United States cannot be considered a substitute for ceasefire negotiations between the two parties to the war. Saudi Arabia and the United States are mediators, while the war is being fought between the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. Regardless of the political and moral stance toward the two parties, stopping the fighting requires their presence together in negotiations that are equitable in terms of procedures, obligations, monitoring, and accountability. This negotiating equality simply means acknowledging a clear military reality: one party cannot declare the end of a war fought by two parties, and no effective monitoring and verification mechanism can be built if the commitments of one party are drafted in its absence. Conversely, the army leadership must not monopolize the title of 'Sudan' in any consultations. The Armed Forces are a national public institution, but they do not define the state, and their current leadership is not an elected government and lacks a popular mandate authorizing it to decide the future of the political system. It is a grave error to call consultations involving the army leadership, Saudi Arabia, and the United States 'Sudanese-Saudi-American consultations,' because this expression effectively equates the leadership of one side of the war with the entire Sudanese state. An equal seat in truce negotiations, not equal rights in deciding the country's future. A crucial distinction must be made here between two different paths: the path to ending the war and the path to political transition. In the first path, the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces must participate with procedural equality, because they are the parties capable of issuing orders to stop fighting, opening humanitarian corridors, redeploying forces, handing over deployment data, and accepting monitoring and verification mechanisms. As for the second path, related to the system of government, the constitution, and civil democratic transition, it must not be subjected to the will of the two military parties. Neither the Army nor the Rapid Support Forces possess a mandate to decide the fate of the people, nor do they have the right to distribute civil power between them or choose the forces that participate in the political process. Independent democratic civil forces must lead the political process, with the participation of representatives of local communities, the displaced, refugees, women, youth, professional unions, and social forces in the affected regions. The role of the two military parties should be limited to the security and military arrangements necessary to end the war, provided they subsequently submit to civil constitutional authority. A unified army is the result of reform, not a negotiating slogan. There is no disagreement that Sudan needs a professional, unified national army, and that there is no place for military formations or partisan, tribal, or parallel militias outside state authority. However, repeating this goal is not enough to prove the seriousness of the project on the table. A unified national army is not built merely by dissolving the Rapid Support Forces or changing their name, but through a comprehensive security and military sector reform process that includes all formations, including the Armed Forces themselves. This requires subjecting the military establishment to constitutional civil authority, ending its economic activities, parallel apparatuses, and partisan networks, and reforming recruitment, promotion, leadership, procurement, and military budget oversight systems. The process also requires disarming parallel formations, demobilizing fighters, and integrating those who are qualified on an individual and professional basis, rather than merging armies and armed blocs as they are. This process should be coupled with transitional justice and accountability for war crimes, without sweeping immunities or deals that allow military leaders to trade impunity for ending the fighting. Therefore, the phrase 'determining the status of the Rapid Support Forces' should not turn into a means to impose a predetermined result before negotiations, nor should it become a pretext to postpone the truce until the army achieves its military objectives. The future of the Rapid Support Forces and all other armed formations must be decided within comprehensive and binding security arrangements, subject to civil oversight and international monitoring, leading to the democratic state's monopoly on the use of force. Where is the admission of failure and taking responsibility? The seriousness of any peace initiative begins with the army leadership's admission that its military and political strategy has failed to protect Sudan. After years of war, this leadership has not been able to protect the country's unity, or the lives, property, or institutions of its citizens. In the face of this failure, it is not enough for it to present itself as the sole guardian of the state and sovereignty. Large parts of the country have turned into arenas open to foreign interference, and the weapons, money, and interests of regional states have become part of the war's equation. Sovereignty is not a speech delivered from a podium, but the state's ability to protect its land and citizens and take its national decisions independently. The recent tragedy of the Sudanese miners puts this issue at the heart of the debate. For this reason, the responsibility of the Egyptian aviation should not be presented as a final truth before the investigation is completed. However, the gravity of the accusations and the evidence in circulation makes the silence of the Sudanese de facto authorities unacceptable. It was their duty to immediately demand an independent and transparent international investigation, to disclose what they know to public opinion, and to protect the rights of the victims and their families, rather than leaving simple miners to face death and then holding them responsible for their presence in disputed border areas. If the responsibility of any foreign state for the bombing is proven, this constitutes a very serious violation that requires accountability and compensation. If the army leadership is unable to defend the citizens or even demand the truth, it should stop using the slogans of sovereignty and dignity to justify the continuation of the war. Egyptian authorities and elites must also realize that Egypt's legitimate interests in Sudan will not be guaranteed by supporting a subordinate and illegitimate coup authority, which a large sector of Sudanese people views as unconcerned with their country's national interests. Sustainable relations between the two countries are built between two legitimate states, and on the basis of respect for peoples and common interests, not through an alliance with a temporary military leadership. What makes a peace project serious? The seriousness of an initiative is measured by the enforceable commitments it contains, not by the frequency of consultations and statements. A real peace project should be based on five interconnected elements (see links to our previous articles below in this regard). First, an immediate humanitarian truce between the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, without military preconditions, including an end to airstrikes, drone attacks, artillery shelling, and ground offensives. Second, an independent international monitoring and verification mechanism, with a field presence and the authority to investigate violations and publish periodic reports, while ensuring the opening of humanitarian corridors and the protection of civilians. Third, separate negotiations on a permanent ceasefire, the withdrawal of forces from civilian facilities, the collection of heavy weapons, redeployment, and the release of prisoners and detainees. Fourth, a civil political process independent of military negotiations, leading to a democratic transitional authority with broad legitimacy, and not allowing the two parties to the war to use weapons to obtain political privileges. Fifth, a national process for security and military sector reform, coupled with transitional justice and the rebuilding of state institutions, leading to a professional, unified army subject to an elected civil authority. Given the collapse of state institutions, the expansion of foreign interference, and the weak trust between the parties, the American initiative should be developed into a multidimensional UN process, under the umbrella of a national project to rebuild the Sudanese state, supported by the United States, the African Union, and regional states. Its role should not be limited to monitoring the truce, but should include protecting civilians, securing the delivery of aid, supporting disarmament and security sector reform, and assisting in transitional justice and state rebuilding. Conclusion: Peace is a commitment, not a maneuver. The problem is not that Lieutenant General al-Burhan proposed holding consultations with the United States or Saudi Arabia; every sincere effort to end the war should be welcomed. The problem is the attempt to turn these consultations into a substitute for equitable negotiation between the two parties to the war, and into a means to grant the army leadership the right to monopolize the representation of Sudan and dictate the terms of the truce and the future of the political transition. If Lieutenant General al-Burhan is serious, he must accept a clear and monitored humanitarian truce without impossible conditions, agree to direct or indirect negotiation with the Rapid Support Forces about stopping the fighting, and accept that the political process is the property of the Sudanese people and their civil forces, not booty to be divided by those who carry weapons. He must also bear his responsibility for the state's failure to protect citizens, demand a transparent international investigation into the bombing of the Sudanese miners, and put an end to using the concept of sovereignty as a cover for subservience and helplessness. Ending the war does not require more deceit and running forward, but a clear separation between the ceasefire table, which must include the two parties to the war, and the democratic transition table, which must be led by civilians. Anything less is not a project to build peace, but a new attempt to manage the war and reproduce the authority of weapons under different titles.