The Sudanese Communist Party and "Sumud": Between the Legitimacy of Dissent and the Danger of Estrangement

When Qurashi Awad stirred the stagnant waters, the relationship between the Sudanese Communist Party and the Democratic Civil Alliance for the Revolution (Sumud) – a relationship long marked by high tension and estrangement – was brought to the forefront. I believe the importance of Qurashi’s discourse lies not only in his frankness in defending his party’s position but also in his approach to managing disagreements with other civil forces. He rejected the notion that political "bickering" should replace dialogue, or that ready-made accusations should be a means to avoid discussing the core of a dispute, calling instead for a rational and civilized approach to managing differences. This is a commendable step. Qurashi was right to warn against a discourse that adopts the identity of the Communist Party, speaks in its name, and then exploits its differences with other civil forces to create an image that does not reflect its declared positions—or pushes it, knowingly or unknowingly, into a corner that serves its opponents' agendas. Such attempts have found their way into media outlets and digital accounts that capitalize on internal civil strife, seeking to widen the gap between the Communist Party and "Sumud" and all other anti-war civil forces. There is, of course, no problem with criticizing the Communist Party or discussing its political, economic, or intellectual stances; this is an undisputed right. The problem begins when criticism exceeds its natural boundaries, turning into the fabrication of an image of the other side, speaking on its behalf, or interpreting its positions in ways contrary to what it states itself, and then building hostility upon this artificial image. This discourse has significantly deepened the distance between the Communist Party and "Sumud," as has the behavior of some individuals affiliated with the party who have followed the discourse of estrangement, inadvertently granting it more space than it deserves. The problem is not the disagreement... but how it is managed. The most important aspect of Qurashi’s talk is that he did not just reject the accusation that the Communist Party is secretly allied with Islamists, but went further: the disagreement is not the problem; the way the disagreement is managed is. This is a point worth pausing at. When Qurashi links certain disagreements with Sumud to economic issues, such as the market economy and the lifting of subsidies on goods and fuel, he returns the discussion to its natural place: ideas should be discussed with ideas, policy with policy, and programs with programs. It is the right of the Communist Party to see some economic trends proposed within the civil forces as incompatible with its vision and to defend its own concepts regarding subsidies, services, social justice, and the citizen’s right to food, medicine, and education. However, the existence of such differences does not make Sumud an existential adversary to the party, nor does it turn an economic disagreement into a justification for political estrangement. Indeed, Qurashi’s own words lead to the most important question: if the disagreement is real, why can’t the dialogue about it also be real? Sumud is a broad alliance, not a rival party. I believe it is necessary, in this context, to correct the image of "Sumud" itself. Sumud is not a political party competing with the Communist Party, nor is it a unified ideological organization with a single intellectual or economic program. It is a broad political and civil alliance that announced itself in February 2025, following the rupture within "Taqaddum" between forces opposing the formation of a parallel government and those supporting it. The new framework included political, professional, and trade union forces, resistance committees, and civil society components, including the National Umma Party, the Sudanese Congress Party, the Federal Gathering, the Sudanese National Alliance, the National Ba'ath Party, the Sudanese National Party, the Unified National Unionist, the Tawasul Party, the Nasserist Party, the HAQ Movement, the National Unionist Party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–Democratic Revolutionary Current, and the United Popular Front, alongside other professional and civil components. This diversity is not a minor detail; it is the essence of "Sumud." It is unreasonable to expect such a broad spectrum to be identical in every intellectual or economic detail. Each component has its own political history, social vision, and intellectual heritage. What unites these components is a minimum level of agreement on major national issues, primarily ending the war, protecting civilians, restoring the democratic civil path, building a state of citizenship, achieving justice and accountability, and rejecting the return of the former regime or the reproduction of totalitarianism. This has been confirmed by Sumud since its inception and by its political document approved in June 2025. Is Sumud closed to dialogue? Here, I disagree with one of the premises that could be understood from Qurashi’s talk. In my estimation, it is inaccurate to portray the situation as if Sumud has closed its doors to the Communist Party and refused to listen to its objections. The facts suggest that the Communist Party received an invitation to participate in the founding conference of "Taqaddum" but reported that it would not participate due to a divergence in vision, which was later confirmed by party leader Kamal Karrar. After the establishment of Sumud, the alliance’s spokesperson at the time, Bakri al-Jak, noted that the Communist Party had become outside the circle of the alliance's outreach to political and civil forces, linking this to the party’s stance on dealing with alliances and political blocs. Conversely, Sumud did not close the door to discussion after its inception; rather, it put forth its political vision to various forces and organizations, sent it to several, and invited them to discuss it, while announcing its openness to critical observations. This is a fact that should not be overlooked in any fair discussion. The Communist Party may have many reasons to object to Sumud, it may refuse to ally with it, maintain its organizational and political independence, and raise reservations about its positions or the positions of some of its components. All of that is legitimate. But a clear distinction must be made between refusing to ally and refusing to dialogue. Political independence is a legitimate right, while estrangement is not a destiny. If the disagreement is deep, it makes dialogue more necessary, not less; because a disagreement that does not reach the discussion table turns over time into misunderstanding, then into prejudice, and finally into a hostility that benefits the parties who do not want this civil front to hold together. Sumud is not a project to liquidate the Communist Party. There is also exaggeration that does not help in understanding the relationship when Sumud is portrayed as a body established to compete with the Communist Party for its supporters, or to vie for its historical position, or to inherit its role within the mass movement. Sumud is not an alternative party to the Communist Party, nor is it an ideological organization competing for the representation of the working class or the popular masses, nor a think-tank seeking to displace it from its historical position. It is a broad political and civil bloc comprising components with diverse orientations, united by a minimum of shared goals, while each retains its own program, identity, and political independence. Therefore, Sumud does not need to liquidate the Communist Party, nor does it have the capacity or the mission to do so. Sudanese history itself is a witness to the impossibility of such a scenario. If dictatorial regimes and their security apparatuses, with all their prisons, repression, and state tools, failed to uproot the Communist Party from Sudanese political life, it is illogical to assume that a multi-component civil alliance would accomplish this task. The more pertinent question is perhaps not: "What does Sumud want to do to the Communist Party?" But rather: "How can the Communist Party manage its relationship with other civil forces in a way that preserves its independence and prevents its depletion in side battles?" A party that has withstood external repression for decades should not allow political differences and poor management of relationships with others to deplete it more than the old tools of repression ever did. Dissent is legitimate... but estrangement is not. It is the Communist Party’s right to oppose any rapprochement with forces it deems to have erred in the past, to express reservations about the regional and international relations of some of Sumud’s components, and to disagree regarding economics, social policies, the shape of the state, the nature of the transition, and international relations. The existence of these differences is normal in any democratic political space. However, what is required is criticism of policies, programs, and positions, not a blanket judgment on the entire alliance, nor a reason to portray it as an enemy to be isolated or besieged. Conversely, Sumud must truly listen to these criticisms, respond with arguments, and review what is worth reviewing. A coalition that raises the banner of democracy should not fear criticism; it should consider it a condition for its vitality. Here, the value of what Qurashi Awad proposed becomes clear: disagreement is useful, but harm lies in the method of managing it. Let us begin the dialogue. Therefore, I take up what Professor Qurashi proposed and say: Let us begin the dialogue from the point you yourself suggested. Not a protocol dialogue, nor a courtesy meeting, nor an attempt to manufacture an artificial agreement, but a democratic, rational, and frank dialogue that discusses, for example: Why did the Communist Party reject Sumud? What are its political, intellectual, and organizational reasons? What are its objections to the alliance’s documents? What are its reservations about the positions of some of its components? Where was the party right, and where might it have erred? Where was Sumud right, and where does it need to review and correct? These questions are all legitimate. There is no need for either party to enter into a dialogue on the condition that the other concedes its position before the discussion begins. It is not required of the Communist Party to join Sumud, nor is it required of Sumud to adopt the Communist Party’s program. What is required is for both sides to sit down. For each side to hear the other, for the party to present its objections in full, and for Sumud to listen to them and answer them in full, then each side can decide for itself what to keep of its position and what needs review. This is the democracy we defend. Unity of purpose and political action does not necessarily require unity of thought. Indeed, disagreement, when managed correctly, can be a way to correct the path rather than destroy the relationship. Here, we may recall the saying of Imam al-Shafi'i: "My opinion is correct, but it might be wrong; the opinion of others is wrong, but it might be correct." No one can claim to monopolize truth, patriotism, or the status of revolutionary forces. The party is greater than its current moment. The Communist Party is not owned by its current leadership, nor by the assessments of its current political moment. It is a long history of struggle, sacrifices, experiences, and interpretations, and it is broader than any one group within it. Therefore, Communists, the party’s militants, intellectuals, and cadres have the right to think, to exercise judgment, to disagree, to criticize, and to review. Respecting history does not mean turning it into immunity from criticism, just as respecting the leadership does not mean disabling the right of the base, cadres, and intellectuals to question and review. A party that wants to remain alive and renewed does not fear reviewing its positions, does not consider admitting a mistake a defeat, and does not see dialogue with those who disagree as a compromise of its independence. Prioritizing. Qurashi Awad was correct in the title of his talk: "My Heart's Feud... or Prioritizing." Sudan today truly needs to prioritize. It is unreasonable for the depletion of civil forces in their internal battles to continue while the war rages, displacement expands, the humanitarian crisis worsens, the civil sphere weakens, and the forces that created or benefited from tyranny seek a way to return. The priority now is to stop the war, protect civilians, prevent the reproduction of totalitarianism, restore the democratic civil path, build a state of citizenship, achieve justice, and hold perpetrators of violations accountable. These issues are larger than any party and larger than any alliance. If there is agreement on these fundamental principles, then disagreements on everything else should not turn into a war within the war. Sudan today does not need one party to triumph over another, nor one alliance over another; it needs the civil-democratic project to triumph over the project of war, tyranny, and totalitarianism. Therefore, Professor Qurashi Awad’s talk deserves to be seen as an opportunity to open a door that has remained closed for too long. I pick up this call and say: Let us open the door. Let us dialogue without preconditions, let us disagree without accusations of treason, and let us discuss with each other in public as befits those who want to build a democratic state. Disagreement does not scare me; estrangement does. Disagreement does not threaten Sumud, nor does it threaten the Communist Party, but the continuation of estrangement between democratic civil forces at a historically dangerous moment could threaten everyone. The strength of Sumud is in the strength of the Communist Party, the strength of the Communist Party is in the strength of Sumud, and the strength of both lies in the strength of the democratic civil movement. It is not in the interest of either to work to weaken the other, to cast doubt on its role, or to diminish its political and mass capital. Let both sides stop breaking each other’s oars, stop exchanging arrows, and focus their effort on what unites them, so that they may deny those waiting for an opportunity to weaken the civil front and widen its fissures. The real battle is not between members of the civil camp, but against the war, the remnants of the former regime, war profiteers, and every project that wants to return Sudan to tyranny or keep it a prisoner of violence and destruction. Thus, coordination between the Communist Party and Sumud does not mean the dissolution of one into the other, nor the abandonment of organizational, political, and intellectual independence, but it means that each party knows where it can work with the other to serve a common goal, and where it maintains its difference and independent stance. Coordination does not negate disagreement, and disagreement does not justify estrangement. This is the real challenge for both sides: to prove that democracy is not just a slogan we demand from our opponents, but a behavior we also practice with our allies and those with whom we disagree within the civil camp. Let us disagree as we wish, but let us disagree while we are sitting at the same table, not while exchanging fire from trenches. Dialogue first, coordination where possible, and unified effort in facing the true enemy, so that we deny the opportunity to those waiting, and preserve for Sudan its path to peace and a democratic civil state. That is the order of priorities. And that is the dialogue that deserves to begin now, not tomorrow.