The Mahdiyya in the Balance: The Mission and the State by the Standards of Their Time and Ours

The Mahdiyya in the Balance: The Mission and the State by the Standards of Their Time and Ours. Homeland, Vision, Peace, Freedom, Justice, Development, and Tribal Policy between 1881 and 1898. By Dr. Al-Rashid Khalifa. Introduction: On Crafting the Balance. Every scale has two pans, and every historian who approaches the Mahdiyya faces two temptations. The first is to judge the past by laws that did not yet exist, like a judge fining a carriage driver for not wearing a seatbelt. The second is to excuse everything in the past on the grounds that “times were different,” becoming a lawyer who never loses a case because his clients are dead. This article seeks to avoid both, placing the Mahdiyya—the Mission (1881–1885) and the State (1885–1898)—on a scale with two pans: the standards of its own time and place, and the standards of our time. The nine criteria used are: the concept of homeland, future vision, peace, national freedom, personal freedom, tribal and political freedom, social justice, economic development, and internal state policy toward tribes and their leaders. One must distinguish between the two phases: the Mission was a revolutionary movement led by Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdallah, who saw himself as a messenger to revive religion. The State was a governance apparatus inherited by Khalifa Abdallahi al-Taishi after the Mahdi’s death in June 1885, forcing the Khalifa to manage a vast country with the tools of a movement never designed for administration [1]. [Section on The Concept of Homeland] By the standards of its time: The Mahdi did not leave Aba Island in 1881 to liberate “Sudan,” but to liberate religion as he understood it. His proclamations do not address “Sudanese” as a nation, but “Beloveds,” “Ansar,” and “all Muslims,” drawing his borders by faith, not geography [2]. The concept of homeland in that era was not the nation-state, but the House of Islam versus the House of Infidelity. The Turks were rejected not for coming from abroad, but for changing religion and oppressing the people. Yet, the Mahdiyya created something akin to a homeland; for the first time, the Baggara, the Northern Nile dwellers, and the Beja were united under one banner against one rule [3]. By the standards of our time: The nation, as Benedict Anderson posits, is an “imagined community” [4]. This imagining only completed in Sudan in the 20th century. Thus, the Mahdiyya was not nationalistic in its time, but became so retrospectively. The Mission was international in rhetoric and national in effect, while the State narrowed this by making loyalty to the Khalifa and his tribe the criterion of belonging. [Section on Future Vision] By the standards of its time: The Mahdi’s vision was revivalist and eschatological. He viewed the era as corrupt, seeking salvation in restoring the early Islamic model. It was a future vision, yet its future lay in the past—like a caravan leader looking at tracks behind him rather than the road ahead. When Khalifa Abdallahi took charge, the vision narrowed from conquering the world to preserving the state [1]. By the standards of our time: A future vision requires a plan with goals and indicators for health, education, and economy. The Mahdiyya lacks such plans in its records. Thus, the Mission had a great vision by the standards of its time, but the State lacked a vision beyond survival by any standard. [Section on Peace] By the standards of its time: Peace in the Mission’s jurisprudence meant the absence of those who refused the pledge of allegiance (Bay’a). While the harvest of war was heavy, the Mahdiyya was fighting on all its borders against regional powers. It was a time when Europe was carving up Africa [3]. By the standards of our time: The UN Charter prohibits the use of force except in self-defense [6]. By these standards, the Mahdiyya’s foreign policy was a series of adventures. The security promised by the Mission against Turkish oppression never materialized under the State because war became its permanent condition. [Section on National Freedom] By the standards of its time: The Mahdiyya’s pan is heavy here; it ended over sixty years of Turkish-Egyptian rule where taxes were collected by the whip [3]. The Sudanese governed themselves for thirteen years. By the standards of our time: National freedom today requires international recognition. The Mahdiyya was viewed as a “revolt” rather than a state, leading to the Anglo-Egyptian re-conquest (1896–1898) [3]. [Section on Personal Freedom] By the standards of its time: The Mission entered the home, regulating dress, banning tobacco and alcohol, and setting dowry limits [1][2]. This social control was common in revivalist movements, but the new State intruded far more into daily habits than the Turkish administration ever did [5][7]. By the standards of our time: Universal human rights guarantee freedom of thought and expression [8]. The Mahdiyya left no space for the individual. [Section on Tribal and Political Freedom] By the standards of its time: Refusing the Bay’a was not a political stance but an act of apostasy. Within the State, there was no political institution for opposition. The “Al-Sayir” prison in Omdurman held anyone suspected of dissent [1][5][7]. By the standards of our time: Political freedom means pluralism and the right to oppose. The Mahdiyya lacked both. [Section on Social Justice] By the standards of its time: Justice was the core of the Mission’s appeal—the Mahdi addressed the poor and abolished unfair Turkish taxes [1]. However, the State eventually transformed the Bait al-Mal (Treasury) into a tool for the military and the Khalifa’s power, favoring his own Ta’aisha tribe [9]. Slavery was not abolished but became part of the state resources [1][10]. By the standards of our time: Equality before the law is paramount. The Mahdiyya began with a banner of justice but ultimately abandoned it. [Section on Economic Development] By the standards of its time: Development was not a concept of that era. The economy was based on booty. When conquests stopped, the state struggled to produce. The “Year Six” famine (1889) was the state’s greatest humanitarian disaster, caused by forced migration and the disruption of agriculture to feed the army in Omdurman [1][5]. By the standards of our time: Amartya Sen argues that famines result from the collapse of entitlements, not just food shortages [12]. The Mahdiyya’s economy was based on forced transfer, not production. [Section on Tribal Policy] By the standards of its time: The Mahdi was a master at uniting tribes during the Mission. However, the State reversed this, replacing traditional leaders with loyalists and favoring the Ta’aisha, leading to internal conflict and massacres like that of the Ja’aliyyin in 1897 [1][3][10]. By the standards of our time: The modern state is based on citizenship, not tribalism. The rift between “the People of the Sea” and “the People of the West” crystallized during the Mahdiyya and remains a root of the “Center vs. Margin” conflict in Sudan today. Conclusion: The Mahdiyya was a mission larger than its state, and a state smaller than its mission. The Mission united and liberated the Sudanese, while the State governed and exhausted them. Though the State failed the people, the Ansar remained steadfast at Karari on September 2, 1898 [13]. The lesson is that the Mahdiyya succeeded in what revolutions need, but failed in what states need—a lesson Sudan has yet to finish learning.