The Horn of Africa on the Edge of the Abyss: Ethiopia's War and its Repercussions on Sudan and Egypt

The Horn of Africa is passing through one of its most dangerous phases in decades, marked by the intertwining of internal wars with regional power struggles and overlapping porous borders with unresolved issues. Ethiopia has returned to the center of this scene as the most volatile flashpoint after fighting renewed in its north and expanded to include several regions. As this crisis intersects with major files—such as Red Sea security, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and the raging war in Sudan—the question of its outcomes extends beyond Ethiopia to the entire region: Where is this war headed? Who will pay the price outside its borders? And will Khartoum and Cairo be dragged into it, or will they manage it from afar? First: The Roots of the Crisis and the Birth of the "Survival Alliance." Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been unable to transform the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the Tigray war in November 2022, into lasting stability. The unresolved issues remained open: the status of the Tigray region, the insurgency in Amhara and Oromia, and the chronic crisis of trust between the center and the periphery. In September 2026, this crisis reached its peak when seven armed groups announced the formation of an alliance aimed at toppling the federal government and forming a transitional government. The most notable aspect of this alliance is that it brings together the adversaries of yesterday; it includes the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara Fano movement, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), alongside groups from Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz. The Tigrayan Front and Fano had fought on opposing sides in the previous war before being united today by a shared hostility toward Addis Ababa. This diversity is both a source of the alliance's strength and its weakness. It gives it a geographical reach that strains the federal army on multiple fronts, but it includes forces that are disparate in their ethnicities, demands, and history. Doubts have begun to grow about its ability to endure as signs of fragmentation appear, while the Ethiopian army has regained the initiative on some fronts and launched a counter-offensive. Second: War and Peace Scenarios. The Long War and Attrition: This scenario is based on the government's commitment to a military victory, countered by the alliance's insistence on its overthrow. Its likely outcome is a prolonged civil war that drains an already exhausted economy, triggers waves of mass displacement toward neighboring countries, and weakens federal state institutions without any party achieving a total victory. This is the scenario closest to reality in the near term, unless there is a major shift in the balance of power or international positions. Settlement Under the Pressure of Exhaustion: This scenario is based on the premise that mutual exhaustion and international pressure will push the parties to the negotiating table. However, its primary condition—the acceptance by Addis Ababa of power-sharing and a rethinking of the federal system's structure—clashes with the current leadership's rejection. Moreover, the fracturing of the alliance may encourage the government to continue fighting rather than negotiate, making this scenario deferred, not excluded. Third: The Regional Dimension and Mutual Accusations. Ethiopia is experiencing simultaneous tension with most of its neighbors. With Egypt and Sudan, the GERD remains the center of contention. With Eritrea, its ally in the previous Tigray war, the relationship has deteriorated due to Addis Ababa's quest for sovereign access to the Red Sea. With Somalia, the agreement with the Somaliland region sparked a crisis that has not yet been resolved. In this climate, the Ethiopian Chief of Staff accused Eritrea of being the mediator linking external forces—among which he named Sudan and Egypt—to armed groups inside Ethiopia, accusations the three countries rejected. Critics of Addis Ababa see this as an attempt to shift the blame for domestic failures onto external actors, while the Ethiopian government believes that an alliance of this size cannot hold without external support. The most prominent regional response came from New Alamein City, where leaders from Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia held a quadrilateral summit calling for political and peaceful solutions to the escalating conflicts in the region. This is a double message: a call for de-escalation on one hand, and a signal of the formation of an aligned regional bloc against Addis Ababa's policies on the other. Fourth: Sudan, the Neighbor Burning Twice. Sudan is not standing idly by in the face of the Ethiopian war; it is living through it while submerged in its own war. The two countries share long, porous borders, a history of mutual suspicion, and unresolved issues: the Nile and the GERD, the disputed Al-Fashaga territory, and mutual accusations of harboring insurgents. A History of Proxy Wars: Current accusations are not new to the relationship between the two countries. In the 1980s, Ethiopia armed Sudanese rebels while Sudan supported Ethiopian armed groups, including the TPLF; the roles then reversed in the 1990s when Ethiopia supported the Sudanese opposition. This pattern returns today in a more dangerous form because both countries are fighting internal wars simultaneously. Intersecting Accusations: When Addis Ababa accused Khartoum of supporting the armed alliance, the Sudanese army rejected the accusation, calling it baseless, and in turn accused Ethiopia of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The relationship had soured months earlier, as Sudan accused Ethiopia and the UAE in May of involvement in drone attacks on Khartoum Airport, stating they had taken off from Bahir Dar airport; Ethiopia denied this and accused Sudan of supporting Tigrayan fighters. Thus, the border strip becomes a potential arena for a proxy war: each party is accused of supporting the other's adversaries, and each war fuels the other. Eastern Sudan in the Danger Zone: The greatest danger lies in the fact that the states bordering Ethiopia—Gedaref, Kassala, and Blue Nile—today represent the relatively safe depth for the Sudanese state and its supply route to Port Sudan. Any major disruption on these borders means opening a new front on the back of an exhausted army. Signs of this appeared early; last March, hundreds of Ethiopians from Tigray crossed into Sudan fleeing battles near the border, and there were casualties in refugee camps on the border strip. With the war expanding now, it is expected that these waves will double, and Sudan, while carrying millions of its own displaced people, finds itself required to host new refugees without resources or sufficient security capacity to control the camps, which could turn into corridors for weapons and fighters. Al-Fashaga: The Open Wound: Al-Fashaga borders the Amhara region, where the Fano militia is now fighting the Ethiopian government as part of the alliance. It is land that Sudan asserts is within its borders according to a demarcation agreement dating back to the early 20th century. Its army deployed forces there during the previous Tigray war, and Addis Ababa accused it of taking advantage of the crisis to enter its territory. This means the current war could reopen the file in both directions: a Sudanese temptation to solidify control, or an Ethiopian attempt to reclaim the land if the situation stabilizes in Addis Ababa's favor. Between Danger and Opportunity: Some decision-makers in Khartoum might see Ethiopia's preoccupation as an opportunity to reduce pressure on unresolved issues, but this is a reading fraught with danger; a fragmented Ethiopia is no less dangerous to Sudan than a strong Ethiopia. Collapse in the neighborhood means uncontrolled borders, weapons flowing in both directions, and armed groups that may align across borders with parties to the Sudanese war. This is why Sudan's position at the Alamein summit was consistent with its need for stability; it supported the joint declaration for the army-led Sudanese government, called for a Sudanese-led political process, and Egypt and Sudan warned against unilateral actions that harm downstream states. Sudan needs regional cover to protect it from becoming an arena for settling Ethiopian scores, more than it needs to engage in them. Fifth: Will Egypt Engage in the War? Cairo does not seem interested in waging a direct war in Ethiopia or becoming entangled in a quagmire of a multi-party civil war whose ends are impossible to predict. The Egyptian leadership has consistently emphasized Ethiopia's unity and stability, and that its crisis is an internal affair. But the absence of direct military engagement does not mean an absence of influence. The Egyptian position can be read on three levels: The Diplomatic Level: Building a network of alliances with Ethiopia's neighbors, as seen at the Alamein summit, to create a regional balance that limits unilateral policies, while responding firmly to any accusations. The GERD File: Egypt treats water security as an existential issue and prefers legal and political paths, but it keeps this file present in every assessment of developments inside Ethiopia. Defensive Readiness: Cairo maintains a defensive deterrence doctrine in anticipation of any direct threat arising from regional chaos, while the military option inside Ethiopian territory remains excluded unless red lines are touched, foremost among them water security. Sudan remains a strategic depth for Egypt in this equation; its stability is a protection for its southern borders and its partner in the Nile file, and its slide into a border war with Ethiopia would place Cairo before options much more difficult than those it faces today. Sixth: Conclusion. Ethiopia stands at a sharp crossroads: either the war leads it to a long attrition that threatens the state's cohesion and exports its crises to the region, or its parties realize that a military victory is an illusion, leading them to a settlement that reformulates the relationship between the center and the regions, and between Ethiopia and its neighbors. As for Sudan, it is the most vulnerable to the repercussions of this war; it stands on its edge burdened by its own war, possessing neither the luxury of adventure nor the capacity for isolation. Its security in the coming phase depends on its ability to fortify its eastern borders, manage the refugee file, and take shelter under a regional umbrella that prevents the two wars from turning into one war that extends from Tigray to Khartoum. As for Egypt, it is most likely to continue a policy based on building regional stability alliances and supporting peaceful solutions, with full readiness to protect its water and national security, without sliding into a war for which it does not hold the keys to the end. The Horn of Africa today is like a house with shared walls: if a fire starts in one room, closed doors no longer protect other rooms from the smoke. Dr. Awad Al-Nager Babiker Mohamed