El-Wathiq Kameir: Between Inclusivity and Selective Standards

In his article on 'Tasis' and the Sudanese dialogue, El-Wathiq Kameir attempts to reconcile the inclusivity of the political process with a refusal to recognize the parallel authorities created by the war. While this objective is sound in principle, his analysis raises questions regarding the consistency of the standards he employs, particularly concerning the legitimacy of authority and the history of the conflicting parties. The writer calls for the non-exclusion of civil forces close to 'Tasis,' yet conditions their participation on adherence to specific principles, without sufficiently clarifying who sets these conditions, how they are adopted, or what guarantees their equal application. Inclusivity is not achieved merely by declaring a desire for it; it requires clear and neutral rules that do not become a means to accept some parties while excluding others. However, the deeper issue in the article is the absence of the political history that led Sudan to the current crisis. The alliance of the army and the Islamists ruled the country for over three decades, and the October 25, 2021 coup contributed to undermining the civil transition and aborting the partnership organized by the Constitutional Declaration between civil forces and the military component. Therefore, the issue of political legitimacy cannot be addressed as if it began with the emergence of 'Tasis,' nor can the existing authority be treated as a neutral representative of the state, in contrast to a parallel entity that alone represents the problem of legitimacy and sovereignty. Recalling this history does not mean justifying the creation of parallel authorities; rather, it requires subjecting all parties to the same political and historical accountability. If the writer rejects turning military control into a source of political legitimacy, this principle should also include forces that used force to undermine the civil transition and contributed to the reproduction of the former regime's authority. In this context, Hemedti's participation in the October 25 coup and his subsequent apology take on special importance. He participated in undermining the transitional partnership before declaring his apology in the context of his objection to the return of former regime elements to positions of influence. This does not absolve him of the responsibility for his participation in the coup, nor does it justify the violations committed by the Rapid Support Forces during the war, but it reveals the complexity of the conflict between parties that participated in undermining the civil transition, then disagreed on the direction of power and the place of the Islamists within it. Thus, reducing the crisis to a confrontation between an army representing the state and a force seeking to establish a parallel authority is not enough to understand its roots. It is also necessary to explain how the transitional partnership collapsed, how the forces of the former regime returned to centers of influence, and how the struggle for power contributed to reaching the current war. Ignoring these questions makes the analysis of legitimacy incomplete, even if the rejection of parallel authorities is a legitimate position in itself. The problem of consistency in standards also appears in the distinction between 'Tasis' and the forces supporting the army and the movements that signed the Juba Agreement. There may be real differences between these cases, but the article does not provide comprehensive criteria to explain them, especially since some movements that signed the agreement later participated in the war. Political history and previous agreements may explain the difference in positions, but they should not turn into an exemption from accountability or a source of permanent political privilege. Furthermore, the writer insists on separating the political and military tracks while acknowledging that civil consensus can contribute to ending the war. This confirms that the two tracks are intertwined and that what is required is to regulate the relationship between them, not to separate them absolutely. Moreover, rejecting quota systems that reward arms-bearers, while accepting the provision of guarantees regarding the upcoming political process, requires a practical clarification of the difference between guarantees of fair participation and guarantees of power-sharing. As for the writer's criticism of reducing Sudan to the camps of the army and the Rapid Support Forces, it clashes with the fact that he essentially classifies political forces according to their proximity to one or the other. It would be better to look at civil forces according to their independence, programs, and positions on the war and democratic transition, rather than letting their positions on the map of military alignment become the basis for determining their political legitimacy. The essence of the problem is not in refusing to recognize a parallel authority, nor in the call for a single national army, but in the necessity of applying these principles within a comprehensive historical and political vision. One cannot reject the legitimization of the military status quo while ignoring the coups that undermined constitutional legitimacy, nor can one take a party's responsibility for a past coup as a justification for granting another party the right to rule or immunity from accountability. The required national dialogue should not be a trial of one party, nor a settlement between arms-bearers to share power, but a political process based on a single standard: rejecting coups, respecting civil rule, holding those responsible for undermining the transition accountable, and preventing the transformation of military force into an acquired right to rule. Only through this can the inclusivity of the dialogue be combined with the rejection of legitimizing war authorities, without selectivity in reading history or double standards in applying them.