The blood of Sudanese miners is not without value… To the civilian forces: open the file on this massacre before international justice!

Alaa Khirawi ■ On the morning of Saturday, October 10, 2026, warplanes raided mining sites and worker camps as some were preparing to begin a new workday and others remained inside mining wells, some of which collapsed on them. The circulating toll is no longer limited to the initial figures of dozens killed; the "Sudan Tribune" newspaper reported, in a report based on testimonies from three survivors, that the number of victims reached at least 200 dead, in addition to hundreds wounded, with fears that the number will rise due to the ruggedness of the region and the lack of medical services, although this toll still requires independent and final documentation. More dangerously, the Egyptian military spokesman issued a statement on October 12 announcing the continuation of the third phase of a broad military and security campaign to combat what he described as illegal gold mining in the Eastern Desert, after dropping warning leaflets on workers in the targeted areas, confirming that the operations aimed to impose Egyptian sovereignty and protect its national wealth. Although the statement did not contain an explicit admission of carrying out the bloody raids, its issuance in the aftermath of the massacre and its acknowledgment of the existence of military and security operations against gold mining in the region raise serious questions about the nature of these operations, their limits, and the responsibility of the entities carrying them out. Making these questions even more serious are accounts reported by "Sudan Tribune" from miners who saw large excavation machinery and trucks moving rocks from the area toward Egyptian territory; these testimonies open another door no less important than investigating the bombing itself, related to the competition for control over mineral resources, especially gold. Here, I do not rule out, in my political reading, that some Egyptian decision-making circles may have seen in the Sudanese war and the collapse of state institutions an opportunity to expand actual control over resource-rich areas and are racing against time to entrench a new economic and geographical reality before the war ends and Sudan recovers its health and ability to protect its borders and wealth. This reading gains its importance from the synchronicity of the announced military operations with the dispute over gold-rich mining sites. If Cairo considers protecting its national wealth a sovereign right, who gave it the right to ignore Sudan's sovereignty and the rights and wealth of its citizens? And who authorizes the use of warplanes against civilians looking for their daily bread, even if we assume for the sake of argument that they crossed disputed borders or engaged in mining without a license? The blood of these Sudanese people is not permissible, Sudan's wealth is not war booty, and the weakness of its state does not grant anyone the right to divide its resources or impose a fait accompli on its lands. What happened north of the valley must not end with counting the bodies, but should rather start with an independent international criminal investigation that identifies who issued the bombing orders, who carried them out, and whether there were economic interests or greed for gold behind the targeting of these miners. The issue is no longer just about who killed the sons of Sudan, but also about who seeks to control the land upon which they were killed and the wealth they went out searching for. These facts, with the serious accusations and unanswered questions they contain, mandate an independent international criminal investigation that does not stop at knowing the number of the dead, but extends to identifying the aircraft used, the party that issued the bombing orders, and the individuals who made and executed the decision. The blood of the Sudanese is not permissible, and international borders, no matter how complex, should not become areas open for the killing of civilians without accountability. ■ Accordingly, I address this call explicitly to the Sudanese civilian forces, led by the "Somoud" coalition, the Sudanese Bar Association, the Journalists' Syndicate, national human rights organizations, resistance committees, war victims' associations, and every organized civilian group that possesses the will and ability to defend the rights of the Sudanese; do not make the demand for justice a hostage to your political position or your calculations with Cairo. The Port Sudan government has not done enough to convince the Sudanese that protecting their dignity is a higher priority than maintaining its regional alliances. Most painfully, the Sudanese citizen, exhausted by war and destroyed by economic crises, and driven by need to search for gold in the harshest deserts, finds himself today in need of someone to defend even his right to life. Therefore, the historical and moral responsibility now falls on the shoulders of the civilian forces who claim to represent the aspirations of the Sudanese for a state of law and citizenship. A state is not built by slogans alone, and sovereignty is not measured by the number of military speeches, but by the ability of institutions to protect the individual, defend their rights, and prosecute those who attack them, regardless of their nationality, position, or the country they belong to. If the current authority does not initiate a transparent and independent investigation, that does not deprive civil society of its right to documentation, litigation, and demanding accountability. ■ Legally, the road to international justice is not closed, although it requires a precise understanding of the competencies of international judicial institutions. The International Criminal Court, established under the 1998 Rome Statute, has jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, according to the conditions set out in its statute. Article 15 allows individuals, groups, and non-governmental organizations to submit information and evidence to the Office of the Prosecutor regarding crimes that may fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, without requiring the national government's consent to simply submit information. This is a fundamental point that Sudanese civilian forces must realize; a coalition of lawyers and human rights organizations can prepare a comprehensive legal file and submit it directly to the Prosecutor's Office via the Court's official platform. What I am calling for is not a promise of an immediate trial, but the initiation of a serious legal path that prevents the loss of evidence and places the alleged crime before the competent institutions, in preparation for accountability whenever objective conditions are met. Intentionally targeting civilians during an armed conflict can constitute a war crime once it is proven that the act is linked to the conflict and its legal elements are met, and an attack on civilians cannot be justified simply because they are in a disputed border area, or because they are mining without a license, or even suspected of violating the laws of the state in which the area is located. There is no license in international law to kill civilians simply for violating immigration, mining, or border-crossing procedures. Even if it is proven that the attack area is located within Egyptian territory, that does not exempt the competent authorities from the obligation to protect the right to life, nor does it prevent the investigation of any unlawful use of lethal force. As for the precise classification of the attack as a war crime or another crime, it depends on the evidence and the circumstances in which it occurred, which is a matter that should be left to an independent legal investigation. ■ Therefore, I call on Sudanese civilian forces and human rights organizations to form an independent legal committee, including Sudanese lawyers specialized in international criminal law, experts in documenting war crimes, forensic doctors, and representatives of the victims' families. This committee should undertake the collection of names of the dead and injured, the documentation of survivor testimonies, the acquisition of medical reports, the preservation of original photos, videos, and their digital data, the precise determination of the locations and timing of the bombing, and the use of independent experts to analyze satellite imagery, potential munitions, and aircraft flight paths, while protecting witnesses from any risks that may result from their testimonies. Afterwards, the file should be submitted to the Prosecutor's Office of the International Criminal Court and also referred to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the African Union mechanisms concerned with human rights. It is worth noting here that the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights extended in May 2026 the mandate of the Joint Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan for an additional year, which provides an existing regional path that can be addressed regarding the facts that fall within its mandate. The Human Rights Council should also be requested to examine the incident and verify the ability of its current mechanisms to investigate it, while seeking to expand the scope of the investigation or create an independent mechanism if necessary. This is not an impossible task, nor does it need in its beginnings an army, a ministry of foreign affairs, or recognition from Port Sudan; it requires civilian will, organized legal work, strict adherence to evidentiary standards, and insistence that the victims' blood does not turn into numbers that vanish in the archives of war. ■ It is necessary here to address Cairo directly, away from the diplomatic pleasantries that have often obscured the truth of the imbalance in Sudanese-Egyptian relations. The historical relations between the two peoples do not grant any authority immunity from accountability, and considerations of Egyptian national security should not be turned into a justification for violating the rights of the Sudanese, just as accusations should not turn into a prior conviction before investigation. If Egyptian forces were not responsible for the attack, an independent and transparent investigation could help prove that and identify the party that carried it out. If the involvement of Egyptian units or officials is proven, responsibility should not stop at the direct perpetrators, but the chain of command and the orders issued must be examined, as well as the responsibility of everyone who ordered, planned, assisted, or failed to prevent crimes that fall within the scope of their legal responsibility. That is the rule that should govern relations between respected nations; no hostility between peoples, no immunity for those responsible for violations, and no bargaining over the blood of the innocent. ■ The issue, in its essence, is bigger than Port Sudan, Cairo, and a border incident no matter how heinous it is; it is the issue of a state where the citizen has lost the sense of the existence of an authority that protects them, and a society exhausted by war to the point where it has to search for justice outside the institutions of its homeland. Perhaps this tragedy reveals, more than ever, that the new Sudan we call for cannot be built on reproducing a state of force, hegemony, and military alliances, but on establishing a state where the human is the goal, rights are the reference, and the law is the supreme authority. Therefore, I believe that the movement of civilian forces on this issue will be a practical test of the meaning of the state they want to build, and of their ability to move from the rhetoric of opposition to assuming true national responsibility. These forces are not required to agree on all political issues to move together to defend the victims; the sanctity of human blood does not need an electoral alliance, the right to life does not wait for a political document, and the demand for justice must not stop at the difference in positions regarding the army, the Rapid Support Forces, or the current authority. The justice we call for for the miners must be part of a comprehensive national principle that rejects the killing of civilians everywhere in Sudan and demands the accountability of perpetrators of violations regardless of the party they belong to. Let this time be different. We do not want new tears over new graves, nor speeches about dignity from an authority we first demand reveal what it has done to protect those to whom it belongs. We want an investigation, evidence, accountability, and rights for the families of the victims. Let everyone proven to be involved in the killing of Sudanese civilians know that the weakness of their state does not nullify their rights, that the world's preoccupation with wars does not erase crimes, and that justice may be delayed, but the duty to seek it begins from the moment blood is spilled. The blood of Sudanese miners is not without value, the dignity of Sudan is not reducible to Al-Burhan, and sovereignty that does not protect the human is nothing but a flag flapping over a wounded homeland!! khirawi@hotmail.com