The Turk or the 'Turkified'

The disparity between the statements of Amjad Farid, an advisor to Al-Burhan, and Osama Abdullah, a prominent leader in the Islamic Movement, regarding the American initiative for a ceasefire in Sudan and the Port Sudan government's readiness to negotiate, is clearly visible. The former welcomed the initiative but conditioned it on the withdrawal of the 'Founding' forces from cities, while the latter expressed readiness to negotiate without preconditions, according to circulating reports. Meanwhile, the Port Sudan government continued its bombardment of civilians in the markets of Nyala and elsewhere. This paradox between statements and practices reminds us of the famous popular proverb: 'Better the Turk than the Turkified.' The National Islamic Front's coup was an earthquake that struck all aspects of life in Sudan, launching an era of repression, killings, executions, ghost houses, and the monopolization of state resources to serve the organization and its members. The country also witnessed wars in the west and south that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens, before ending in an all-out civil war that displaced the people, destroyed their dignity, led to the secession of the south, and burdened the public with hunger and suffering. Therefore, any talk of negotiation cannot be separated from this legacy, nor from testing its credibility through practice rather than rhetoric. However, just as every earthquake has its aftershocks, the monopolization of opportunities, resources, and state apparatus for more than three and a half decades has led to the emergence of interest groups within the Islamic Movement. Their calculations, visions, and decisions vary to the point that the movement has become like a mythical multi-headed, multi-armed creature whose components' wills do not necessarily align, even if united by shared interests. This multiplicity explains why calls for negotiation can coexist with the continuation of the war, and why the question of who actually holds the decision-making power becomes more urgent than merely reading statements. In light of this reality, several regional powers seek to support Al-Burhan, based on the premise that the army possesses an alleged independence from the Islamic Movement. Al-Burhan has gone far in capitalizing on this support, to the point of making concessions that, in my estimation, affect national constants related to sovereignty, in exchange for military support. Here too, the contrast appears between the image that is meant to be presented of an independent authority, and the practices that reveal the web of interests and pressures that dictate its choices. Perhaps the appointment of Amjad Farid, alongside his uncle and others who do not have known ties to the Islamic Movement, regardless of their competence, can be read in the context of Al-Burhan's attempt to expand his political base, invest in regional support, and present an image of an authority not limited to the Islamic Movement alone. However, expanding the political facade does not by itself answer the most important question: Does that truly change the nature of the decision, or does it merely add new faces to an authority whose practices remain governed by older power centers? In any case, I believe this disparity reflects the nature of the balances within the power camp. As long as the Islamic Movement and its associated interest groups lack a unified stance, it will remain difficult to rely on positive statements alone as proof of sincere intentions toward ending the war. The essence is not only in what is said, but in the decisions taken and what is happening on the ground; for the continued bombardment, despite talk of negotiation, puts statements to their real test. Perhaps Osama Abdullah's recent statements, if correctly attributed to him and interpreted, are aimed at sending a message to the American administration saying: 'We are here,' or in other words: Let us see who is the boss. In my estimation, these statements reveal an attempt to show that there are internal power centers that cannot be bypassed when making decisions related to war and negotiation, and that the declared official position does not necessarily reflect the true balance of power within the ruling camp alone. Thus, the issue is no longer just a difference in tone or conditions, but becomes additional evidence of the gap between what the authority declares and what it can, or wants to, actually implement. Here returns the question posed by the article's title: Who holds the actual decision? Al-Burhan, the Islamic Movement, or the interest groups that formed under its shadow and have come to possess influence that sometimes surpasses official institutions?